Summary & Conclusions -In this paper, we investigate the availability requirement for the fault management server in high-availability communication systems. According to our study, we find that the availability of the fault management server does not need to be 99.999% in order to guarantee a 99.999% system availability as long as the fail-safe ratio (the probability that the failure of the fault management server will not bring down the system) and the fault coverage ratio (the probability that the failure in the system can be detected and recovered by the fault management server) are sufficiently high. Tradeoffs can be made among the availability of the fault management server, the fail-safe ratio and the fault coverage ratio to optimize system availability. A cost-effective design for the fault management server is proposed in this paper.
nine system availability. Based on this intuition, it was strongly recommended in [2] that the fault management software should run on fault-tolerant computers which can perform logic self-checking and have all of the main components (e.g., CPU, memory, I/O controller, bus, power supply and disk, etc.) physically duplicated. However, according to our study, this is not necessarily true. Besides the availability of the fault management server, there are another two parameters, i.e., the fault coverage ratio (the probability that the failures in the system can be detected and recovered) and fail-safe ratio (the probability that the failure of fault management server will not bring down the system), determining the availability of the system. In order to dissipate this potential misconception, one needs to rephrase the system availability question as follows: what minimum level of availability needs to be achieved by the support systems (e.g., maintenance servers, network management servers, etc) in order to guarantee a 99.999% availability for the operational part of the system (that part in charge of delivering the main system functionality)?
The Markov models for a cluster of computers were constructed and system availability was studied as a function of fault coverage ratio and individual computer availability in [3] [4] . It was found that higher system availability could be achieved over a cluster of computer with non-fault-tolerant architecture if higher coverage ratio could be well provided. However, the availability of the watchdog (i.e., the server) and its fail-safe characteristics were not considered in the se two papers.
Fail-safe behavior is the ability of a system to fail without producing a catastrophic result [5] . The concept of fail-safe systems has been well defined and widely used in LSI design [5] [6] [7] and railway applications [8] , etc. The research in these areas focused on the conditions for achieving safety properties in a system, and its formal expression and proof. In this paper, we introduce a new parameter, i.e., fail-safe ratio, to quantitatively investigate the impact of failsafe design to the system availability.
After constructing and solving a Markov chain for a communication system with N functional units (each functional unit configured as "1+1") and one fault management server, we study the relationship of the server availability, f ault coverage ratio and fail-safe ratio to the system availability. We determine that the fault management server availability does not have to be 5-nine in order to achieve 5-nine operational system availability as long as the fail-safe ratio and coverage ratio are sufficiently high. Availability along with the coverage ratio and fail-safe ratio are three important parameters of the management server, which can be traded off to achieve higher operational system availability. Because the fault-tolerant comp uters are very expensive, our observations lead to a more cost-effective design of the fault management server. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce the fault management model used in the paper and the concepts of fail-safe, fail-safe ratio, and coverage ratio. In section 3, we construct a Markov chain model and give a closed-form expression to the system availability. Some properties with respect to the fail-safe ratio and coverage ratio are derived in Section 4. A cost-effective design for the fault management server is proposes in Section 5.The numerical results and discussions are given in section 6. 
Notation

FAULT MANAGEMENT MODEL AND SOME CONCEPTS
As shown in Figure 1 , there are N functional units and one fault manage ment server in the system. Each functional unit has "1+1" equipment, with one for primary and the other for hot standby. Each equipment element has a local (equipment-level) fault management. The fault management server redirects traffic to the redundant equipment in case the primary equipment fails (the fault could not be recovered by the equipment-level fault management). 
Fail-safe Ratio
Fail-safe is the ability of a sys tem to fail but not produce a catastrophic result [5] . The concept on fail-safe system has been well defined and widely used in LSI design [5] [6] [7] and railway control [8] . In this paper, we revise the definition on fail-safe and extend it to the communication system.
[Definition] A fault management server is called fail-safe if the failure of the fault management server will not drag down the system.
In order to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the fail-safe property, we introduce a new parameter called fail-safe ratio, p f , which is defined as the probability that a failure of the fault management server will not bring the system down. Two extreme cases are p f =0 and p f =1. p f =1 means that the failure of the fault management server will not drag down the system, which corresponds to the design that the fault management server is not involved in the normal operation of the system and only deals with the fault management functionality. p f =0 means that the failure of the fault management server will definitely drag down the system, which corresponds to the design that the fault management server is involved in not only the fault management functionality but also the normal operation of the system, e.g., distributing traffic load and load balancing.
Fault Coverage Ratio
Because of the complexities and uncertainties of the network and its faults, and the design fault in the fault management software, a completely automated fault management is a very tough objective to reach. We assume the fault coverage ratio, i.e., the probability that the fault management server can detect the failure in the functional units and redirect traffic to the backup equipment automatically, to be p c . In this paper, the coverage ratio is assumed to be the same for all the functional units. If the fault management server fails to detect and recover the failure in the functional units, it takes time T s (i) for the operator to perceive the failure and manually switch the traffic for functional unit i. Improving the quality of fault management software, incorporating artificial intelligence [9] [10], and neural networks [11] are potential solutions to enhance the fault coverage ratio. 95% fault coverage was achieved in Siemens' EWSD switches when artificial intelligence was implemented [9] .
MARKOV MODEL
For functional unit i (with "1+1" equipment), we consider the following two major cases:
• The fault management server is not working • The fault management server is working
In the first case, functional unit i is working if and only if the primary equipment is working (no matter the standby one is working or not) and the failure of the fault management server does not bring down the primary equipment, with probability (1-A m )p f A e (i), where
To evaluate the probability of the functional unit being working at the second case, we construct a Markov chain shown in Figure 2 . We denote
• (1,1) as the state where both equipments are working • (1,0) as the state where the primary equipment is working and the standby equipment is not functional • (0,1) as the state where the primary equipment fails and the standby has not taken it over • (0,0) as the state where neither equipment is working.
The Markov chain in Figure 2 is obvious except the transition from (1,1) to (1,0) and (0,1), which is explained as follows. Starting from state (1,1), the system transits either
• to (0,1) with rate (1-p c )λ f (i) if the primary equipment fails and the failure is not recovered automatically, or • to (1,0) if the backup equipment fails (with rate λ f (i)) OR the primary equipment fails but the failure is recovered automatically (with rate p c λ f (i)).
Figure 2. Markov Chain for Functional Unit i with the Fault Management Server Being On
Solving the Markov chain, we have the functional unit availability under condition that the fault management server is working,
Apparently, it is a decreasing function of switchover time T s (i).
The functional unit availability is given as
and the system availability is given as
SOME PROPERTIES [Property 1]
A s is an increasing function of p f, and ∂A s / ∂p f is a decreasing function of A m [Proof] The property is readily proved by using: 
and θ(i) >0, we have:
Property 1 implies when A m is lower, the system availability improvement brought by increasing fail-safe ratio is more significant than the case when A m is higher. Property 2 implies when A m is higher, the system availability improvement brought by increasing coverage ratio is more significant than the case whe n A m is lower. 
[Pro perty 3] When A m >A' m, ∂A s / ∂p c > ∂A s / ∂p f , which means the system availability improvement caused by increasing the coverage ratio is more significant than by increasing the fail-safe ratio. 
[Property 4]
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COST-EFFECTIVE DESIGN FOR THE FAULT MANAGEMENT SERVER
During the development phase of a high-availability communication system, we may face an optimization problem, i.e., we like to minimize the cost given the system availability requirement, or maximize the system availability given the development budget. Because we focus on the fault management server in this paper, the cost-effective design of the functional units is beyond the scope of this paper, and the availabilities of the functional units are assumed fixed.
The total cost of the fault management server is given by
The multi-objective optimization problem can be solved with the methods in [12] . Note that C 1 (p c ), C 2 (p f ), and C 3 (A m ) are increasing, but may not be linear functions.
In this paper, we solve a simpler optimization problem. When a company develops a communication system, it usually purchases the platform for the fault management server from third party, and develops the fault management software proprietarily. 
Cost-effective Design
Comparing the cost increase in (13) and (16), we can get the cost-effective solution.
One thing should be noted that improving system availability by improving the coverage ratio and fail-safe ratio does not mean the fault management server can be built on a very vulnerable platform. According to Property 1 and 2, system availability is an increasing function of the fault coverage ratio and fail-safe ratio. However, the improvement on system availability achieved by only increasing the fault coverage ratio and fail-safe ratio is limited. The best case is p f =p c =1.
which means the fault management server should be built on a platform with a minimum availability as shown in (18). 
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we give an example for a system with two functional units. A f (1)= A f (2)=0.999429549 (1/λ f (1)= 1/λ f (2)= 1 year, 1/µ f (1)= 1/µ f (2)=5 hours) and T s (1) = T s (2) = 30 minutes. Table 1 gives A s versus A m , p f and p c. We study five cases: (p f =0.9, p c =0.9), (p f =0.99, p c =0.9), (p f =0.9, p c =0.99), (p f =0.999, p c =0.999), and (p f =1, p c =1). The numerical computations are obtained by using SHARPE software package [13] . Property 3 can be partially confirmed by calculating the availability difference between the second and third case, which shows that the second case provides higher availability when the availability of the fault management server is lower than 0.999, and the third case provides higher availability when the availability of the fault management server is not less than 0.9999. We can then conjecture that when the availability of the fault management server is lower, failsafe ratio plays a more critical role than the coverage ratio to the system availability. On the contrary, when the availability of the fault management server is higher, coverage ratio plays a more critical role than the fail-safe ratio to the system availability. The turning point A' m in this case is between 0.999 and 0.9999. In order to further illustrate Property 3, we compare the downtimes for the first three cases (i.e., 525600×(1-A s ) minutes) in Figure 5 . The difference between the systems with (p f =0.9, p c =0.9) and (p f =0.99, p c =0.9) is more significant than the difference between the systems with (p f =0.9, p c =0. From Table 1 , one can see that 5-nine (0.99999645) system availability is achieved when p f =0.999, p c =0.999 and A m =0.999, which means that the fault management server is not necessarily to be 5-nine (3-nine is sufficient in this example) in order to achieve 5-nine system availability if the fail-safe ratio and coverage ratio are high enough. Therefore, availability along with the coverage ratio and fail-safe ratio are three important parameters of the fault management server, which can be traded off to achieve higher system availability. The findings are intuitively explainable. The system level availability eventually comes from the functional units. The presence of fault management server has both positive and negative impacts on the availability of the functional units. The server can help in that it increases the chance of recovering a failed unit (modeled as the coverage ratio), which otherwise would have to go through a longer manual repair. The server presents negative impact as well if its own failure affects the rest of the system (the effect captured by fail-safe ratio). This explains why coverage and fail-safe ratios are so vital to system availability. At the same time, also keep in mind that the chance that both the equipment and the fault management server fail at the same time is very slim. It implies that failure on the server shall not present the major downtime for any functional units. This seems to explain why the server's own availability does not appear to be a dominant negative factor.
In the example given in Table 1 , suppose we have designed a system with p c =0.99, p f =0.9, A m =0.999, and A s =0.99989653. The current cost is 1.6 million dollars according to the cost functions assumed in the previous section. In order to achieve 5-nine system availability, we can increase p c and p f to 0.999, or increase A m to 0.99999. Both cases are highlighted in Table  1 with italic bold-faced font. According to the cost functions assumed in the previous section, the costs are 2 million dollars and 2.2 million dollars respectively. The system architect can make decision based on cost estimation. Table 1 also shows that with 2-nine fault management server platform, the maximal system availability is 0.999987306, which means that if the platform for the fault management server is 2-nine, there is no way to get 5-nine system availability unless purchasing a platform with higher availability (e.g., 3-nine). Table 2 lists the system availability with lower manual switchover time, i.e., T s (1) = T s (2) = 10 minutes. All the other parameters are the same as the cases in Table 1 . One can see that the system availability is a decreasing function of switchover time. One interesting observation is that the second case provides higher availability than the third case when A m is between 0.99 and 0.9999. The turning point A' m in this case is between 0.9999 and 0.99999. Therefore, decreasing the manual switchover time may push the turning point A' m higher, which implies that decreasing the manual switchover time ma y weaken the impact of the coverage ratio. This conclusion can also be confirmed by comparing the values at row "3 rd case -1 st case" in Table 1 and 2, which are around 1.02E-05 and 3.4E-06 respectively.
It should be pointed out that although the properties and results in this paper are derived for "1+1" case, the Properties 1-5 and the cost-effective design are still applicable to "M+1" case if partial outage and partial availability is not considered, i.e., assuming one functional unit is considered as working iff there are M operational equipments. If partial outage and partial availability is considered, the proof of Properties 1-5 is not so easy, and is open for future studies. 
